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Musical Ontology: Critical, not Metaphysical
  Jonathan A. Neufeld 
Abstract
The ontology of musical works often sets the boundaries within
which evaluation of musical works and performances takes
place.  Questions of ontology are therefore often taken to be
prior to and apart from the evaluative questions considered by
either performers as they present works to audiences or an
audience’s critical reflection on a performance.  In this paper I
argue that, while the ontology of musical works may well set
the boundaries of legitimate evaluation, ontological questions
should not be considered as prior to or apart from critical
evaluation.  Rather, ontological claims are a type of critical
evaluation made within musical practices.  I argue that
philosophers of music might learn from the debate in political
philosophy about the difficulty of setting the limits of public
reason in a way that remains open to a plurality of legitimate
evaluative perspectives.  Just as pre-political or metaphysical
identification of the boundaries of public reason fail to
accommodate the fact of pluralism in contemporary democratic
politics, so too does a metaphysical identification of the
boundaries of legitimate evaluation of musical works and
performances fail to accommodate the fact of pluralism in
contemporary musical practices.  I apply John Rawls’s
formulation of political liberalism, arguing that musical
ontology should be critical, not metaphysical.
Key Words
comprehensive liberalism, Stephen Davies, deliberation, Lydia
Goehr, Jürgen Habermas, Andrew Kania, Jerrold Levinson,
music, music criticism, musical ontology, musical performance,
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1. Introduction:  ontology in criticism
A few years ago I attended a performance in New York by a
string quartet which played selections from Bach's The Art of
Fugue.  As the subject of one of the fugues was passed from
one instrument to another, each member of the quartet
played it in a markedly different style.  The first violin played
with a relatively wide and almost lush vibrato, occasionally
sliding a bit between notes.  The second violin and cello played
in a style that was closer to historically informed performance
practice:  they vibrated less frequently and more narrowly;
their articulation was slightly shorter with their modern bows
grabbing the string less than the first violin’s, which resulted in
a tone that was less rich and full.  The violist played quite
brightly and angularly, with a faster and narrower vibrato than
that of the first violinist but vibrating more frequently than the
second violin and cello. He played with no slides; his style was
quite modern.  When they finished, I looked at my companion
and commented favorably, “That was interesting.”  She replied
with a bit of contempt, “It wasn't really Bach.”
My companion, whom I’ll call  Rachel, did not mean to point
out that the ensemble had simply played badly.  One might
imagine hearing a performance of four extremely incompetent
or perhaps inebriated players muddling their way through a
work and wondering to oneself whether that would really
qualify as a performance of the work.  The case with the
performance of The Art of Fugue was quite different. The
players were excellent, sober, and played exactly as they had
intended.  Rachel's critical comment was meant to condemn
what they had set out to do:  they executed their plan well,
but the plan itself was flawed.  They claimed it to be a
performance of Bach, but it ended up falling short of that or
perhaps going well beyond that—I am not sure the distinction
matters in the end.  What mattered to Rachel was that to her
it was not Bach.  Moreover, her critical expression was neither
formulated as, nor meant as, I think, an expression of
preference or of mere taste.  Rachel stated that what we had
heard, far from being a good performance of Bach, as I
thought it was, did not present us with the work of Bach at all.
 To Rachel, despite the quartet’s members  playing the sounds
well, they  had failed, in a deep way, to perform Bach.
While one should not be too quick to draw deep philosophical
conclusions from a casual bit of conversation after a concert,
this sort of claim is made with surprising frequency in music
criticism.  In one recent example, the essayist and music critic
Rip Rense argued against Los Angeles Times music critic Mark
Swed's favorable review of the Los Angeles Opera's new
version of Wagner’s Ring, staged in 2009 by Achim Freyer.
“Swed remarks casually, ‘this is not. . .a singer's Ring.'  Isn't
singing rather central to the proceedings here?  Isn't singing
the main point of opera? Because this “Ring” seemed less
concerned with the singing, or in highlighting the singing,
Swed wrote that this would be upsetting only to
'traditionalists.'  Isn't this a bit like saying that a football game
without a ball might upset old-school fans?”[1]
Note the ground to which this sort of comment moves a
critical discussion about a performance.  Rachel and I (or
Rense and Swed) might have talked about what we liked and
disliked about the performance as one often does in polite
musical company.  Instead, we talked about what the work we
heard was really like relative to what the composer wrote, and
the various ways in which this ought to bind performers.  Our
discussion, under a cloud of judgment prompted because the
apparently descriptive statements were said with contempt,
touched on fundamental questions about the nature of music,
the nature of performance, and the nature of musical works--
in short,  questions pertinent to the ontology of music.
2. Musical ontology and comprehensive liberalism
In Art and its Objects, Richard Wollheim writes, “The artist has
built an arena, within which we are free, but whose boundaries
we must not overstep.”[2]  That is, when interpreting or
evaluating works, our freedom is bound by the limits of the
works themselves.  This statement about overstepping the
limits of a work itself takes on a particular urgency when
addressing musical performers.  After all, performance gives
more than a critical reflection on a work: it is only through
performance that musical works sound in public at all.  It is
perhaps no surprise, then, that philosophers of music have
been particularly keen to determine precisely what the limits
of a work are that the performer must not overstep.  Many
recent philosophers of music have understood this question of
boundary-setting metaphysically and thus would have it that
determination of these limits is not part of the practice of
interpretation, performance, and evaluation, but more a
matter of pre-practical ontological identification.
If determining how our freedom is bound by the works
themselves is a matter of metaphysics, then my conversation
with Rachel was one that involved finding the right description.
 The performance we heard could then be judged according to
whether it overstepped the boundaries that the metaphysics of
musical works set for it.  If this is correct, then the answer to
the philosophical question raised by our conversation was
logically prior to the critical judgment. Rachel’s contempt--the
implied and so it was bad embedded in her statement “It
wasn’t Bach”--would only make sense against a particular
metaphysical backdrop, “in a particular arena,” to use
Wollheim’s words.  Our conversation was in part aimed at
discovering the particular arena in which we were playing.  The
metaphysics of music is therefore especially important in the
chain of critical argumentation; it is a sort of gatekeeper of
both criticism and performance—the two major modes of
deliberation in the musical public sphere.
I use the language of public spheres deliberately to draw
attention to what I take to be an illuminating parallel between
philosophy of music and political philosophy.  Both liberal
political philosophy and the philosophy of music as considered
here are concerned with the criteria of legitimate deliberation
and evaluation in their respective spheres of discourse.  Each
allows for the plurality of evaluative perspectives at play in a
relatively diverse audience, what John Rawls calls the “fact of
pluralism.”[3]
The fact of pluralism compelled Rawls and others to develop a
political, as opposed to a comprehensive, liberalism. Political
liberalism attempts, though not always successfully, to avoid
relying on metaphysical or comprehensive philosophical
commitments when setting the limits of legitimate political
deliberation.  By contrast, arguments in the philosophy of
music highlighting the limits of legitimate musical deliberation
often quite directly and explicitly depend on robust
metaphysical or ontological commitments.  These theories in
what Andrew Kania has called the fundamentalist debate are
analogs to foundational, comprehensive or metaphysical
liberalism.[4]
The comprehensive liberal’s pursuit of sharp “pre-political”[5]
conceptual boundaries to the public sphere has been called
into question on a number of fronts, including from within
liberalism itself.  There are concrete political consequences to
this sort of boundary setting that a variety of political theorists
continue to explore.  Robert P. George, an advocate of natural
law theory, captures the core problem well: “[Public reason]
almost always has the effect of making the liberal position the
winner in morally charged political controversies.  It does this,
in effect, by ruling out of bounds substantive moral argument
on behalf of non-liberal positions.”[6]  Pluralism is taken to be
so deep and wide that commitment to any fixed foundational
conception of the limits of public discourse would be
unacceptably exclusionary or anti-democratic.  As a result,
deliberative democrats, radical democrats, agonistic
democrats, republicans, and communitarians, among others,
have aimed to reconceive questions of political legitimacy in
ways that avoid the kind of exclusion generated by the
comprehensive liberal account of public reason and to bring
even these foundational questions into the arena of critical
deliberation.
I suggest that, just as the boundary-setting of comprehensive
liberalism in political philosophy fails to satisfy its own demand
of taking the fact of pluralism seriously, so too the ontological
boundary setting in the philosophy of music fails to appreciate
the consequences of taking the dynamic pluralism of the
modern musical public seriously.  I am concerned that the
supposedly neutral, metaphysical characterization of musical
works serves as a veiled, and sometimes not so veiled,
normative constraint on musical practice.  What causes me
concern is not the normativity of the constraints[7] but rather
that the sources of the normativity supposedly lie beyond the
contentious give and take of public musical practice.
 Ontological constraints on musical performance should be
embraced, if at all, as normative claims from within the
musical public sphere rather than as metaphysical constraints
imposed from without.  While there has been some movement
toward a musical ontology that tethers itself more closely to
musical practice,[8] the active and normative role—the critical
role—of setting the boundaries of musical works has still been
overlooked.  To echo John Rawls’s formulation that liberalism
should be political, not metaphysical, claims of musical
ontology should be taken to be critical, not metaphysical.      
3. The limits of legitimate listening
Jerrold Levinson’s influential philosophy of music provides a
particularly clear example of the consequences of the musical
analog of the comprehensive metaphysical liberal position.
Levinson argues that there is a distinction among the musical
work itself, an instance of the work, and a performance of the
work.  The work itself is an initiated type comprising a sound
and performance means structure as indicated by a composer
at a particular time.  “Instances of the work are a subclass of
the set of performances of a work.  A performance of a
musical work W is a sound event that is intended to instantiate
W--i.e., represents an attempt to exemplify W’s S/PM [sound
and performance means] structure in accordance with the
composer’s indication of it—and which succeeds to a
reasonable degree.”[9]  All instances are performances, but
not all performances are instances.  For example, dropping
three notes of Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata disqualifies
an act as an instance of the work for Levinson, who follows
Nelson Goodman’s stringent criteria for performances.[10] 
Breaking from Goodman, Levinson argues that a non-instance
can count as a performance, and possibly even a great one
since “...that [it is] strictly incorrect by no means entails that
[it is] bad.”[11]
On the one hand, Levinson has done well to distinguish
between instance and performance by showing that modern
audiences, critics, and performers are not in general concerned
with perfect instantiation of a score when listening to a
performance.  This is a sensible acknowledgement of and
departure from what is generally regarded as Goodman’s
conceptually consistent but overly rigid account of
performance.  On the other hand, it is not at all clear that
judgments concerning the identity of the performance,
especially in difficult cases that challenge the “to a reasonable
degree” requirement, do not bleed straight away into aesthetic
judgments.  The supposedly non-aesthetic, non-normative
commitment to certain identity criteria of performance either
is in itself aesthetic or at least directly requires certain
normative commitments at the level of performance
practice.[12]
The resonance of this interpretation with liberal political
philosophy comes out clearly in Levinson’s argument for the
“perspective relativity of evaluation of performance,” that
there is no single best performance of any given work,
because each performance can be heard from a number of
distinct legitimate perspectives.  He argues that an
experienced listener will evaluate a performance differently
from how a neophyte, a performer, a professional critic, a
composer, or a musicologist would, because each perspective
presupposes different interests and capacities. Levinson thus
calls our attention to the fact of pluralism in musical
audiences.  Though the array of possible evaluative
perspectives and their corresponding interests appears to be
fairly diverse, Levinson sensibly points out that not just any
perspective or set of interests may be given a valid voice in
evaluations of performances.  At the very least, the
perspective must be appropriate to the domain and should not
merely flout the conventions of the practice.  Levinson thus
calls attention to the need to identify a reasonable pluralism of
perspectives. 
One can immediately identify several easy cases of
unreasonable perspectives:  a singing drunk’s or an earplug-
wearer’s interest in loud performances, for example, would
clearly not be legitimate.  But there are more difficult and
more interesting cases that put the particular characteristics of
Levinson’s musical public sphere in sharper relief.  Consider his
treatment of Wendy Carlos’s Switched on Bach, an album
recorded in 1968 containing versions of works by J.S. Bach
played on a Moog synthesizer.  It is worth quoting at length:
Certainly these have their appeal.  Is there, then,
a musical perspective or listener whom they
address, whose gratification is thus a justification
for regarding them as good?  The answer is yes
and no.  They do address a certain kind of
audience, but (a) addressing that audience is not
a legitimate musical objective, and (b) in
addressing that audience Bach’s music is unduly
distorted and transmogrified. The Moog Bach
provides an engaging musical experience to a
certain kind of listener which ordinary Bach,
apparently, cannot.  But this is a dull, lazy,
unpracticed listener, one who needs constant
highlighting, gratuitous regular changes,
impossibly rapid tempos, and a realm of sounds
not too far removed of contemporary popular
music.  Enveloping a work in alien sonic dress,
submerging and obscuring its basic identity, is no
service to it and meets the needs of no listeners
deserving consideration.  The falsification of
Bach’s works represented by these
pseudoperformances is not redeemed by the
supposed end of enabling or facilitating musical
appreciation ‘down the line.’  For the nature of
the appreciation these caricatures lay the
groundwork for is precisely in question. Extreme
violence to a musical tradition seems a very
suspect method of insuring its ultimate survival or
preservation.  One is reminded of having to
destroy villages in order to save them.[13]
The problem with Switched on Bach, according to this
remarkable piece of criticism, is that it submerges and
obscures the “basic identity of the work.” It is not a bad
performance of Bach; it is not a performance of Bach at all,
though it claims to be one.  This is a very strong claim, an
elaborated form of Rachel’s response  described at the
beginning of this paper.  Where one might contest the line
between good and bad performance within the historical
confines of the musical practiceit is up to the members of the
music critic community to argue it out. The line between
performance and non-performance, the central criterion for
falsification, is established by Levinson as a matter of
ontology.  It is not a matter for the musical public to decide; it
is a matter of metaphysics and as such is prior to and apart
from critically engaged reason-giving within the musical public
sphere.
This is achieved by allowing the work, as determined by
ontology, to have a unique position of authority within the
musical public sphere.  The work places conceptual constraints
on the identity of a performance which are prior to the
performance’s evaluation; that is, they preempt or trump
consideration of other interests.  This effectively removes what
we might think of as the work’s interests from at least a
certain sort of criticism from within the musical public sphere.
 Yet claims based on the work’s authority are made against the
interests of particular audiences within the practice (by
metaphysicians of music who have discovered these interests).
 The description of Carlos’s Switched on Bach as something
that is not an actual performance serves as a club to be
wielded against a particular drift within the practice of Western
art music or “classical music.”  Levinson’s shift to talk of what
counts at all for a performance precludes a need to argue
normatively against “pseudo-performances.”  It simply takes
them off the table of evaluation with one hand while rendering
a rather devastating criticism of them with the other.  If
falsification is taken seriously, the ontological characterization
of what it is to be a performance preempts a number of
evaluative judgments and stakes out the arena in which first
order conflict will take place, stacking the deck in favor of
particular evaluations within the practice, in essence
prejudging that the practice ought to develop in a particular
direction and not another.
While I have no desire to defend or attack Carlos’s Switched
on Bach as a good or a bad performance of Bach, I do want to
defend the possibility of allowing the diverse members of
music practice to determine whether it is. In some
circumstances (not all that uncommon, it would seem), such
musical practice results in a confrontation about whether it is
a performance at all.  But if I am right, this ontological dispute
emerges from arguments within critical practice.
4. Ontological pluralism and descriptivism
One might think that the problem as I’ve described it so far is
really just a problem of insensitivity to the complexity of
musical practices and tastes.  In response, one might multiply
kinds of musical works, making for an even more deeply
pluralistic ontology of performances and works. Stephen
Davies has been ambitious in this regard, identifying six types
of musical work and performance.  Each type emerges from an
historical practice. Works created for electronic production or
for recording, for example, emerges from the ontological
possibilities created by modern technology.  This pluralistic
conception of musical ontology (there is not just one thing
called a musical work, but many) best accounts for “the
criteria on which we base our understanding and
evaluation.”[14]  Despite this welcome nod to context and a
richer engagement with music history, the same metaphysical,
comprehensive view is present here although in a more
disguised form.  “To enjoy music, one must be able to locate
the relevant object and apply to it the appropriate mode of
appreciation.”[15]  Davies’s discussion of the moral
responsibilities of performers to perform works authentically
makes vivid the point that ontological identification of the
relevant object is still prior to normative public engagement.
Where musical works exist and where audiences attend
performances in order to hear those works, the first aim of the
activity of performance is to deliver the work in question to
the audience (and a crucial further aim is to do so well). To
meet these aims the performer must exercise his or her
creative talents within bounds prescribed both by the
composer and by the wider conventions of the composers' day
which governed the performance of works of the type in
question.  Performers and audiences come together on the
basis of an understanding of the point of the activity in which
they are jointly involved.[16]
The fact that works of various types came into existence at
various times and have various conditions of identification
doesn’t change the fact that the most fundamental relationship
between a work, its performance, and legitimate criticism is a
matter of metaphysical specification.  That is, ontology’s
authoritative determination of legitimacy, though allowing for
more categories of performance, is no less authoritative and
determinative.  This determination, as Davies makes clear, is
prior to the audience and performer coming together in the
context of a performance.  They have agreed in advance on
the point of the activity in which they are jointly involved:  the
performance is not a space to work out, reflect on, or
deliberate about that activity.
More recently, Andrew Kania has argued that the ontology of
music ought to be more closely tethered to practice, and
philosophers should engage in a descriptive metaphysics (a
term Kania takes from Peter Strawson).  Such a descriptive
metaphysics of music would pick out and rationally reflect on
the existing norms of musical practices and the intuitions of
participants in the practice.  Clarifying them would involve
achieving a reflective equilibrium between more refined
philosophical modal intuitions and the probably somewhat
messy state of musical practice.[17]  While this is a much
more promising methodology for musical ontology, since the
source of normativity is now the practice itself, Kania's account
of “musical practice,” like Levinson's, encompasses our
performance and our critical practices but not, apparently,
philosophy.  Descriptive metaphysics stands outside of the
musical practices it describes and quietistically leaves them as
they are.
Descriptive metaphysics would achieve this by describing the
“actual structure of our thoughts about the world,” according
to Kania.[18]  A philosophical account might, of course, differ
from our pre-theoretical thoughts about the actual structure of
thoughts about the world.  That is, one might be surprised by
the rational reconstruction of some practice or other.  Or it
might present our thoughts to us for the first time, so to
speak, in its rational reconstruction of our previously
unreconstructed thoughts.  “We think that?” we might ask. It
is worth considering our reactions to philosophical arguments
about music.  Broadly, there are two ways one might react to,
or even dispute, the findings of a descriptive metaphysician.
 One might find counterevidence for the description in existing
practice and so engage in descriptive metaphysics on its own
ground.  That is, one might simply do more philosophy in
response.  But there is another possible response that is not
uncommon in critical practice:  one can produce
counterevidence for the description of existing practice.  One
can make music differently, either as a composer or as a
performer.  A description of a way of thinking (of our settled
intuitions, in this case) often provokes widespread
reconsideration of doing when we are concerned with matters
of thoughts about artistic practice. Does a descriptive
metaphysics, then, really leave the world as it is?  In many
cases, it might.  The practical ramifications of reporting a
rational reconstruction of how we treat “existence” or “being”
in musical practice might well be minimal.  More detailed, and
more specific reconstructions and descriptions of the way we
treat musical works and performances have been shown, again
and again in history, to be capable of having serious practical
consequences. Such consequences, in turn, result in a change
in the data the description has set out to rationally
reconstruct.
Let us consider an example that I have greatly simplified for
the sake of brevity:  Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music
was taken quite seriously by Wagner and it influenced his
composition.  Schopenhauer argued that music is different
from all of the other arts, and that it had a special connection
with the world as it truly is.  While the other arts were able to
access eternal Ideas, the most basic universal and eternal
representations of the world in itself, the world as will, they
were still once removed from the reality of the world in itself.
 Music, on the other hand, was a direct representation of the
world as it is in itself.  This world as will, always moving, is
expressed in the world of representation as striving, suffering,
longing, growth, and dissolution.  In response, as an attempt
to compose in accord with Schopenhauer's philosophical
account of music, Wagner broke down both genre boundaries
and formal expressive boundaries in music.  One can also
trace the influence of Feuerbach on Wagner’s conception and
attempted creation of The Artwork of the Future.[19]
Nineteenth-century critic, musicologist, and philosopher
Eduard Hanslick's deep disagreement with Wagner and
Schopenhauer about what music in itself can express (and
thus what constitutes a musical work and what counts as a
proper performance of it) was expressed philosophically in On
the Musically Beautiful, in his critical writings, and in his
advocacy for the compositions of Brahms.[20]  Wagner,
famously, responded to Hanslick both in print and in music.
Wagner aimed a musical broadside at Hanslick when he
created the pedantic, rule-bound, error-making character,
Beckmesser ( named Veit Hanslich in an earlier draft), in his
opera Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg. While my history here
is extremely simplified, it illustrates how philosophical
accounts, especially of controversial, difficult, or transitional
works, are often inextricably woven into the very practices
they explain.  The work the ontology of music does, and  the
kinds of actions (performances, composing works, doing
philosophy) that might count as responses to it, are quite
varied.[21]  
It is telling, then, that the philosopher of music is absent from
Levinson’s list of “some of the points of view for evaluating
performances,” though the musicologist, music theorist, and
other composers are included.  The same absence, perhaps
more puzzlingly, plagues Kania’s descriptive metaphysics.  To
describe the norms and intuitions actually operating in musical
practice is, in part, to describe the philosophical arguments
that helped make the practice what it is.  To engage in the
philosophy of music as a form of descriptive metaphysics
should bring one to notice that the philosophy of music plays
more than a merely descriptive role in musical practice.  This
was true of the philosophy of music in the past (I briefly
mentioned the middle of the nineteenth century, but could
have mentioned numerous other periods), and I can see no
plausible way to exempt current philosophy of music, at least
conceptually, from this active role.
5. Conclusion:  making a problem of the musical work
Two claims emerge from what I’ve argued so far:  first, that
many arguments concerning the metaphysics of music, the
ontology of performances and non-performances, are not
merely descriptive or conceptual claims about musical
practices; and second, that philosophers ought not try to
pretend that they are and should self-consciously situate their
arguments within critical public practice.  The first claim is
more philosophically substantive and points toward what I
take to be the practical role of philosophy in the musical public
sphere.  If I am right, philosophy already takes an active role
in practical musical debates but often stands apart from them,
mediating them from the outside.  This is not to be corrected
by making more carefully descriptive, non-normative claims
about the concept of the musical work.[22]  Even if it were
possible to remove philosophical description from the direct
critical engagement of practice, it is not clear why we would
want to do so.  It seems to me that there are at least strong
prima facie reasons not to argue for the complete practical
detachment of one’s theories from the cultural practices they
explain.
If musical ontology is removed from a precritical metaphysics
and folded into music's broader critical practice, then
ontological arguments can be viewed as arguments for a
certain sort of limitation on the kinds of evaluative reasons
that can legitimately be offered with reference to a
performance of musical works.  Ontological arguments can be
viewed as of a piece with critical evaluation of musical
practices.  This, to me, seems  the most natural reading of
Levinson’s criticism of Switched on Bach, in spite of its
placement as an example for a metaphysics of music and its
relationship to evaluation.  I think this is also the most natural
reading of Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful, especially
when one takes his extensive public criticism into account.
Bringing ontological arguments within the sphere of ordinary
critical argumentation opens the very structure of the musical
public sphere more directly to public deliberation.  It also
opens musical works and performances to precisely the sort of
unreflective criticism that worries Levinson in the Switched on
Bach example.  It is what Roger Scruton derisively identifies as
democratic or democratizing criticism.[23]  The central worry
about democratic music criticism, as both Levinson and
Scruton point out, is that it threatens the integrity of musical
works that are generally accepted to be of great value.  Once
musical practice is opened to every sort of contestation and
participation, everyone would have an equal right to make any
sort of claim about every performance in the musical tradition.
 This is true in theory but not something to worry too much
about in practice.  Assume for the moment that the audiences
addressed by Carlos’s Switched on Bach really are “dull, lazy,
and unpracticed.”  This ought to make addressing them by
articulating other, sharp, industrious, and well-practiced
interests particularly easy, almost as easy as dismissing the
earplug-wearer’s request for a loud performance.  The key,
though, is that the performance traditions challenged by
Switched on Bach, or any number of boundary-pushing
performances, must constantly be revisited, re-examined and
re-justified in light of an ever-shifting practice.
An advocate of a comprehensive liberalism, in the spirit of
John Stuart Mill perhaps,[24] might respond that I am overly
optimistic and that, in fact, responding to the challenging
interests expressed by democratizing criticism is not so easy.
Moreover, there may be a real danger of the musical public
becoming dominated by a sort of tyrannical yet dull, lazy and
unpracticed (DLU) majority.  This is a legitimate worry but
attempting to build a wall around the concept of the musical
work and simply to define unsavory interests as illegitimate is
both futile and counterproductive.  Instead, philosophical
critics should make explicit their judgments about the direction
and structure of musical performance practice. Arguments
ruling certain performances out of court should explicitly
involve engaging in public criticism.  Levinson’s worries about
the interests served by Switched on Bach might be fleshed out
as a worry about what sort of relationship the audience should
have with Western classical music—or, more broadly, what
role and what character audiences should have in the musical
public sphere.  A dull, lazy, and unpracticed audience is unable
or unwilling critically to participate reflectively and critically in
the musical public sphere.[25]  Using the language of Rawls’s
political liberalism, such an audience is not an unreasonable
one, but one in which reasonableness is a matter of openness
to critical participation in musical practice.  It is this very
openness that makes the disputed expression of interests
possible in the first place and that maintains the productive
and creative movement of public musical practices.  When
considered in this light, the problem of music and the DLU
listener is clearly a kind of political problem, not to be solved
by even the most careful ontological arguments, unless these
arguments are themselves taken to be normative
commitments within the musical public sphere.
This is not to say that there are no performance traditions
involving authoritative reference to works that can be quite
formally identified, or that all such traditions should be
overturned.  In fact, pursuing a critical ontology might often
look very much like pursuing a metaphysical ontology.  I am
not objecting to seeking out, clarifying, or practically calling
attention to the basic building blocks of musical practice.  I am
objecting to taking these gestures as independent of, and
without effect on, those basic building blocks and musical
practices.[26]  Habermas argues, referring to political
deliberation and law,  that the crucial question is not whether
formalized or routinized patterns of performance exist, but
“how the latter can be changed. This in turn depends on
whether the settled routines remain open to renovative
impulses” from all corners of the public, especially from the
“periphery” that might not ordinarily be noticed or heard.  This
sort of reflexive performance practice open to change is
characterized by “a heightened public attention, an intensified
search for solution, in short, by problematization.”[27]  This
thought is remarkably close to one of Adorno’s
characterizations of music performance. “Adequate
performance requires the formulation of the work as a
problem, the recognition of the irreconcilable demands, arising
from the relation of the content [Gehalt] of the work to its
appearance, that confront the performer.”[28]  Such critical
interventions into the very question of what is public, or what
is a musical work, are precisely what the metaphysical
conceptions of political or musical performance rule out.
All members of the musical public sphere—composers,
performers, audiences, musicologists, and philosophers—ought
to be conceived as engaging in just this sort of
problematization.  For the ontology of music, even pluralistic
and descriptivist ontologies, the central demands of the
musical work cannot be problematized in this sense; they can
only be analysed and described.  However, in a modern
performance practice, no metaphysical account of music can or
should constitute a yardstick against which a given
performance, composition, or interpretation is measured.
Rather, musical ontology may, at best, play a role in particular
arguments within an historically grounded deliberation within
the musical public sphere.  Music, for better or worse, is in our
hands.[29]
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